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South Dakota Amendment E Ruled Unconstitutional – Is
There A Future For Legislative Involvement In Shaping The
Structure Of Agriculture?
— by Roger A. McEowen* and Neil E. Harl**
In South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. et. al. v. Hazeltine,1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit upheld the Federal District Court for the District of South Dakota and ruled
the South Dakota anti-corporate farming law unconstitutional on “dormant commerce
clause” grounds.  The opinion is viewed as critical to the future viability of anti-corporate
farming restrictions in other states2 and, more generally, to the ability of state legislatures
to shape the structure of agriculture within their borders.
Anti-Corporate Farming Restrictions
Presently, nine states prohibit corporations from engaging in agriculture to various
degrees.3  Recently, consolidation in almost every aspect of the farm economy has further
threatened the continued viability of a vibrant, independently owned and widely dispersed
farm production sector with the specter of being vertically integrated (largely through
contractual arrangements) in the production, processing and marketing functions.  Thus, as
concentration of agricultural production has accelerated in recent years, legislatures in
many of these same states have attempted to legislate protections for the economic autonomy
of individual farmers and the environmental health and safety of both the rural and non-
rural sectors.
The South Dakota Provision
The South Dakota restriction dates from 1974, and in 1998 South Dakota voters amended
the state constitution (known as “Amendment E”) to prohibit corporations and syndicates
from owning an interest in farmland (with numerous exceptions).4  Section 21 states:
“[n]o corporation or syndicate may acquire, or otherwise obtain an interest, whether
legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any real estate used for farming in this state, or
engage in farming.”
Section 22 exempts “family farm corporations” or “family farm syndicates” as follows:
“a corporation or syndicate engaged in farming or the ownership of agricultural land,
in which a majority of the partnership interests, shares, stock, or other ownership
interests are held by members of a family or a trust created for the benefit of a member
of that family.  The term, family, means natural persons related to one another within
the fourth degree of kinship according to civil law, or their spouses.  At least one of
the family members in a family farm corporation or syndicate shall reside on or be
actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm.  Day-to-day
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statute was not present in the Missouri statute.  The court reasoned
that the statute was indifferent to livestock sales occurring outside
Missouri and had no chilling effect on interstate commerce because
packers could easily purchase livestock other than in Missouri to
avoid the Missouri provision.  The court also noted that the Missouri
legislature had legitimate reasons for enacting a price discrimination
statute, including preservation of the family farm and Missouri’s
rural economy, and an improvement in the quality of livestock
marketed in Missouri.18  Specifically, the court opined that the
Missouri legislature had the authority to determine the course of
its farming economy and that the legislation was a constitutional
means of doing so.
The Hazeltine Court’s Rationale
In a discussion involving the issue of the plaintiffs’ standing, the
court in Hazeltine cited an Ohio statute that charged out-of-state
natural gas vendors at a higher sales tax rate than certain in-state
vendors.19  The court reasoned that the South Dakota livestock
feeders contracting with out-of-state firms that were not within an
exemption under the South Dakota law were similarly disaffected
because of the imminent loss of business if Amendment E were to
be enforced.  However, the court did not discuss the obvious
difference between the Ohio statute and Amendment E.  The Ohio
statute treated out-of-state natural gas vendors differently from in-
state vendors.  Amendment E treats all businesses operating in South
Dakota under the same set of rules, regardless of whether the
business is a South Dakota business or an out-of-state enterprise.
Under the Hampton20 rationale, the test is whether Amendment E
has an extraterritorial reach requiring business transactions
conducted in states other than South Dakota to be governed in
accordance with South Dakota law, not whether South Dakota
businesses are financially injured because of business relations with
companies not coming within an exemption to the law.  While the
court was addressing legal standing on this point, the court was
also framing the dormant commerce clause issue.  Unbelievably,
the court did not make even a single reference to its prior opinion
in Hampton Feedlot.21
The court also provided no analysis on the issue of what entity is
actually performing farming operations under the contract feeding
arrangements.  If the South Dakota feeding operations are making
the relevant production decisions under the contracts and are the
ones rendering material participation, then it seems highly unlikely
that the out-of-state contracting parties could be found to be engaged
in farming in South Dakota in a manner that Amendment E
prohibits.22   The court, again without discussing the matter, simply
assumed that Amendment E would apply to the contract feeding
situations in the case.23
Without any analysis of the actual language of Amendment E,
the court determined that South Dakota voters had acted with a
discriminatory purpose in enacting Amendment E.  The court noted
that the record contained a substantial amount of evidence on the
point.24  The court also found relevant on the discrimination issue
statements of drafters, as well as a statement of a co-chairman of
the Amendment E promotional organization that Amendment E was
motivated in part by the environmental problems caused by large-
scale hog operations in other states.25    The court called this
statement “blatant” discrimination.26  The court also found indirect
evidence of discrimination in that the drafters and supporters of
Amendment E had no evidence that a ban on corporate farming
labor and management shall require both daily or routine
substantial physical exertion and administration.”
The plaintiffs, a collection of farm groups, South Dakota
feedlots, public utilities and other farm organizations, challenged
Amendment E on the basis that it would prevent the continuation
of their existing farming enterprises unless those enterprises
changed organizationally to come within a statutory exemption.
Specifically, several of the plaintiffs feed livestock in their South
Dakota feedlots under contracts with out-of-state firms and claimed
that Amendment E would apply to their out-of-state contracting
parties and hurt economically their South Dakota livestock feeding
businesses.5
The “Dormant Commerce Clause”
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, § 8,
Clause 3) forbids discrimination against commerce, which
repeatedly has been held to mean that states and localities may
not discriminate against the transactions of out-of-state actors in
interstate markets even when the Congress has not legislated on
the subject.6  The overriding rationale of the commerce clause
was to create and foster the development of a common market
among the states and to eradicate internal trade barriers. Thus, a
state may not enact rules or regulations requiring out-of-state
commerce to be conducted according to the enacting state’s terms.7
Historically, dormant commerce clause analysis has attempted
to balance national market principles with federalism, and was
never intended to eliminate the states’ power to regulate local
activity, even though it is incidentally related to interstate
commerce.8  Indeed, if state action also involves an exercise of
the state’s police power, the impact of the action on interstate
commerce is largely ignored.9  Absent an exercise of a state’s police
power, the courts evaluate dormant commerce clause claims under
a two-tiered approach.  If the state has been motivated by a
discriminatory purpose, the state bears the burden to show that it
is pursuing a legitimate purpose that cannot be achieved with a
nondiscriminatory alternative.10  However, if the state regulates
without a discriminatory purpose but with a legitimate purpose,
the provision will be upheld unless the burden on interstate
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the benefits that the
state derives from the regulation.11  In essence, a state may regulate
transactions that occur within its borders,12 but not those that occur
elsewhere.13
“Dormant Commerce Clause” Precedent in the Eighth Circuit
In Hampton Feedlot, et. al. v. Nixon,14 the court upheld against
a dormant commerce clause challenge provisions of the Missouri
Livestock Marketing Law  that the state legislature passed in 1999
preventing livestock packers that purchase livestock in Missouri
from discriminating against producers in purchasing livestock
except for reasons of quality, transportation costs or special
delivery times.15  The law requires any differential pricing to be
published.16 The trial court held the law to be unconstitutional,
but the Eighth Circuit reversed.  While the court noted that the
Act closely resembled an earlier South Dakota law that had been
found unconstitutional,17 the court noted that the Missouri
provision did not eliminate any method of sale – it simply requires
price disclosure.  More importantly, however, the court noted that
the Missouri statute, unlike the South Dakota provision, only
regulates the sale of livestock sold in Missouri.  As such, the
extraterritorial reach that the court found fatal to the South Dakota
130 Agricultural Law Digest
would preserve family farms or protect the environment, and that
no economic studies had been undertaken to determine the
economic impact of “shutting out corporate entities from farming
in South Dakota.”27  Because the court found that Amendment E
was enacted with a discriminatory purpose, the state bore the
burden to show that it had no other way to advance legitimate
state interests.  The court held that the state failed to meet its
burden.
Implications of the Decision
If left standing, the Hazeltine court’s opinion raises serious
concerns about the analysis of future dormant commerce clause
cases in the Eighth Circuit, the doctrine of stare decisis, the theory
of separation of powers and the ability of states to regulate business
conduct within their borders.28  The court’s willingness to ignore
its prior opinion in Hampton Feedlot29 and not evaluate the actual
language of Amendment E on dormant commerce clause grounds
poses difficulty for other states defending against either current
or future challenges to anti-corporate farming laws.30  It would
appear at this time, however, that the court is not favorably disposed
to anti-corporate farming laws in general, and may also strike down
other laws designed to deal with the structural conditions presently
facing family farming and ranching operations.  The court’s
opinion represents a complete shift from its opinion in Hampton
Feedlot,31 and the court appears to have adopted the modern
economic theory of free trade as its framework for evaluating
commerce clause cases involving state regulation of business
activity.32  Unfortunately, the court failed to note that the types of
production contract arrangements involved in the case have been
used in other settings to provide vertically integrated firms with
market power and to exclude producers from competitive market
outlets for their products.33
It is hoped that the Eighth Circuit will reconsider its decision in
Hazeltine and continue the judicial path laid down in Hampton
Feedlot.34
FOOTNOTES
1
  No. 02-2366, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17018 (8th Cir. Aug.
19, 2003), aff’g, 202 F. Supp.2d 1020 (D. S.D. 2002).
2
  The opinion takes on even greater significance because many
of the states with the major restrictions on corporate involvement
in agriculture are located in the Eighth Circuit.  See, e.g., Minn.
Stat. § 500.24; Mo. Ann. Stat. Ch. 350; Neb. Const. Art. XII, § 1;
Iowa Code § 9H; N.D. Cent. Code § 10-06-01.
3
  The states are Iowa (Iowa Code § 9H.1 et. seq.); Kansas (Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 17-5901 et. seq.); Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. §
500.24 et. seq.); Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 350.15); Nebraska
(Neb. Const. Art. XII, § 8(1)); North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code §
10-06.1-02); Oklahoma (Okla. Const. Art. XXII, 2); South Dakota
(S.D. Codified Laws § 47-9A-3); and Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 182.001).
4
  S.D. Const. Art. XVII, §§ 21-24.
5  Two of the plaintiffs feed cattle under contract with out of
state firms, one plaintiff raises contract hogs and another raises
contract lambs.
6  See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)
(holding as unconstitutional a city ordinance prohibiting sale of
milk in city unless bottled at approved plant within five miles of
city); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
432 U.S. 333 (1977) (state statute requiring all closed containers
of apples sold or shipped into state to bear “no grade other than
applicable U.S. grade or standard” held unconstitutional
discrimination against commerce).
7
  See, e.g., American Meat Institute, et. al. v. Barnett, 64 F.
Supp.2d 906 (D. S.D. 1999) (South Dakota price discrimination
statute declared unconstitutional because it applied to livestock
slaughtered in South Dakota regardless of where livestock
purchased).
8  See, e.g., Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)
(state legislation designed to maintain clean air constituted
legitimate exercise of police power allowing state to act in many
areas of interstate commerce).
9  Id.  A strong argument can be made that Amendment E was
also enacted according to the state’s police power to protect South
Dakotans from adverse health and environmental effects of large-
scale, vertically integrated livestock operations.  In that event, the
impact of the law on interstate commerce would be less of a
concern.
10
  See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).  But,
the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving discriminatory
purpose.  Id.
11  See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)
(state law prohibiting interstate shipment of cantaloupes not packed
in compact arrangements in closed containers, even though
furthering legitimate state interest, held unconstitutional due to
substantial burden on interstate commerce).
12  Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S.
346 (1936) (court upheld Pennsylvania price control statute as
applied to purchasers of milk in Pennsylvania by a dealer who
intended to ship all the milk out of state; Court stated that purpose
of statute was “to reach a domestic situation” and that the activity
regulated was “essentially local”).
13  Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (court
struck down statute requiring milk purchased out-of-state to not
be sold in New York unless out-of-state producers had received
New York minimum price); but see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934) (court upheld New York law setting minimum prices
paid to milk producers, as applied to purchases by New York
retailers from New York producers).
14  249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
15  Mo. Stat. Ann. §§ 277.200; 277.203; 277.212 (2000).
16  Mo. Stat. Ann. § 277.203(2).
17
  S.D. Codified Laws § 40-15B et. seq.
18  The court found persuasive the testimony of a witness for the
state that by providing an incentive for packers to buy livestock
on the basis of quality through the grade and yield method,
producers would make better genetic decisions, raise better quality
animals and earn a better price.  The court also noted that, under
the current system, larger producers receive premiums for their
livestock, giving them an economic advantage over smaller
farmers.
19  An Ohio manufacturing facility purchased nearly all of its
natural gas from out-of-state suppliers subject to the higher sales
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26  However, state legislation designed to maintain clean air has
been held to constitute a legitimate exercise of the state’s police
power allowing the state to act in many areas of interstate
commerce.  See, e.g., Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960).
27  The court failed to mention the numerous exemptions under
the South Dakota provision.
28  It is noted that South Dakota is expected to file a petition for
rehearing with the court.
29  249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
30
  The state of Iowa presently has an appeal pending with the
Eighth Circuit involving the state’s ban on packer ownership of
livestock.  Smithfield Foods, Inc. et. al. v. Miller, 241 F. Supp.2d
978 (S.D. Iowa 2003).  Most of the states with major anti-corporate
farming laws are located within the Eighth Circuit.
31  249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
32  Indeed, the court cited H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336
U.S. 525 (1949), where the Court stated that “the vision of the
Framers was that every farmer . . . shall be encouraged to produce
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in
the Nation.”
33
  For a discussion of these issues see, McEowen, Carstensen
and Harl, note 22 supra; Stumo and O’Brien, Antitrust Fairness
vs. Equitable Unfairness in Farmer/Meat Packer Relationships, 8
Drake J. of Ag. L. 91 (2003); and Carstensen, Concentration and
the Destruction of Competition in Agricultural Markets:  The Case
for Change in Public Policy, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 531 (2000).
34
  249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
tax rate, and was held to have standing to challenge the statute
because it was financially injured.
20  249 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
21
  Id.
22
  For a discussion of the issue of packer ownership and control
of livestock through contractual relationships and the effort, at
the federal level, to ban packer ownership of livestock, see
McEowen, Carstensen and Harl, “The 2002 Senate Farm Bill:
The Ban on Packer Ownership of Livestock,” 7 Drake J. of Ag.
L. 267 (2002).
23
  It is noted, however, that had the court analyzed the issue
and determined that the out-of-state companies were engaging
in farming in South Dakota under the contracts, the issue would
have remained as to whether Amendment E discriminated against
these businesses by treating them in a more disadvantageous
manner than in-state businesses.
24  For example, the court noted that the “pro” Amendment E
statements compiled by the Attorney General informed voters
that without passage of Amendment E, “[d]esperately needed
profits will be skimmed out of local economies and into pockets
of distant corporations,” and “Amendment E gives South Dakota
the opportunity to decide whether control of our state’s agriculture
should remain in the hands of family farmers and ranchers or fall
into the grasp of a few, large corporations.”  The court claimed
that these statements were “brimming with protectionist rhetoric.”
25  Why the court found statements of intent relevant to the
discrimination issue without examining the content of the
language of Amendment E is not explained.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL
DISCHARGE. The plaintiffs operated a dairy farm and had
purchased feed from the debtor under the recommendation of a
nutritionist employed by the debtor. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit
for damages to the cows resulting from improper formulation of
the feed by the nutritionist. While the lawsuit was pending, the
debtor filed for Chapter 11. There was some dispute as to whether
the plaintiffs received proper notice of the bankruptcy proceedings,
and the plaintiffs failed to file a claim in the bankruptcy case. The
debtor’s plan provided that “administrative trade claims” would
be paid as in the normal course of business without necessity of
the creditor filing a claim. A discharge was granted in the Chapter
11 case. The plaintiffs sought further prosecution of the lawsuit
and the debtor filed for summary judgment based on the discharge
of the claim in the bankruptcy case . The plaintiffs argued that the
lawsuit was an “administrative trade claim” which was not
discharged. The trial court granted the summary judgment, holding
that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not an administrative trade claim
because the plaintiffs had liability insurance to cover their claim.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the existence or non-
existence of liability insurance was irrelevant to whether the lawsuit
was an administrative trade claim. The case was remanded for a
ruling on whether the plaintiffs’ suit was an administrative trade
claim. The appellate court noted that administrative trade claims
include tort claims because such claims are an ordinary cost of doing
business. Fieber’s Dairy, Inc. v. Purina Mills, Inc., 331 F.3d 584
(8th Cir. 2003).
The debtor had given a creditor a packet of financial materials as
part of a request for an extension of credit on a farm loan. The
materials included a list of equipment owned by the corporation
wholly-owned by the debtor. Some of the equipment was not owned
by the corporation but was owned by the debtor and the debtor’s
brother who farmed separately. However, the financial materials
also included a depreciation schedule which was not consistent with
the list of equipment. No tax return was required from the debtor by
the creditor. During the application period, the corporation was in
the process of reorganizing by distributing the debtor’s brother’s
